Abstract Malaysia is a net importer of rice. More than a quarter of its rice requirement is met by import. Rice imports play a crucial role in determining the country's food security. Import strategy of the company, which owns the exclusive import right, has a profound impact on an array of economic, political, and societal stabilities. However, domestic agricultural policies and relevant past studies have not addressed the strategic concern in the current food security framework. Therefore, this study analyzes demand patterns of rice imports in Malaysia with an ultimate intention to provide policy implications for its food security. From the Error Correction Model of Almost Ideal Demand System (ECM-AIDS), estimates of demand elasticity suggest that rice imports will be narrowly sourced, largely from Vietnam with Thailand second in importance. Such an import strategy is similar to the precrisis model, which was weak in mitigating negative effects of supply disruption during the Food Price Crisis 2007/08. Instead, the exclusive importer could (1) multi-source rice imports, (2) import paddy (for longer storage life and supporting downstream activities), and/or (3) balance its business orientation with the national food security. In sum, this study provides evidences for the need to consider rice imports in the country's future food security framework.
Introduction
The Food Price Crisis in 2007/08 has spawned serious implications for food security, particularly among rice importing countries. Foremost, the post-crisis rice prices are still higher than the pre-crisis levels. In response to this, many South East Asian countries have shifted their rice policies towards production (Demeke et al. 2009 ). These are designed to boost domestic rice production and reduce reliance on rice imports. The Malaysia government has also adopted this approach and introduced the National Food Security Policy at the height of the Food Price Crisis. The overarching objective is to boost domestic rice production, with a short-term target of achieving a self-sufficiency level (SSL) of 86% in rice by 2010 (Agri-food Business Development Centre 2010). In addition, the latest target in the Tenth Malaysia Plan is to maintain a minimum 70% self-sufficiency level throughout 2011-2015 (the Economic Planning Unit 2010). Clearly, the country will have to continue to import rice for many years to come.
As a net importer of rice, national food security is partially determined by rice imports. Thus the import strategy of the group of companies known as, PadiBeras Nasional Berhad (BERNAS), which owns the exclusive import right, has a profound impact on an array of economic, political, and societal stabilities. However, all previous (e.g. the Ninth Malaysia Plan and the Third National Agricultural Policy) and current agricultural policies (the National Food Security Policy and the Tenth Malaysia Plan) have neither emphasized the strategic role of rice imports nor their import strategy in the national food security framework. Relevant past studies (e.g. Overton 1999; Nur Annizah and Pazim @ Fazim 2005; Azmi et al. 2009; Tey 2010 ) also have not addressed the strategic concern of safeguarding the country's food security.
Clearly, there is a knowledge gap in understanding how well rice import strategy is being carried out and whether there is a need to consider rice imports in the country's future food security framework. Understanding this requires an empirical insight into demand patterns. Therefore, this study analyzes demand patterns for rice imports in Malaysia. The findings of this study provide important insight into how imported rice is demanded (sourced) from various countries with implications for future import strategy and national food security.
Background
In Malaysia, rice is imported exclusively by BERNAS. According to the Economic Planning Unit (2004), BERNAS was a corporatized entity of Lembaga Padi dan Beras Negara (National Paddy and Rice Board), which was managed by the Ministry of Agriculture in 1994. BERNAS was privatized in 1996 and publicly-listed in 1997. From the transition, BERNAS 'inherited' the commercial and social functions of Lembaga Padi dan Beras Negara. Among these are its duties to (1) ensure fair and stable rice prices, (2) provide sufficient supply of rice, and (3) assure quality and standard of rice to consumers. It also undertook importing duty that was previously managed by the board. Subsequently, it was granted the exclusive right to import rice for 15 years, up to 2010 with another optional 5-year extension. Though there is no official announcement on the extension, BERNAS has remained as the single rice importer at the time of writing this study.
Importing sufficient rice to supply consumers is one of BERNAS's key duties. Owing to population growth and increasing demand for rice, total imports handled by BERNAS grew from about 590,000 metric tons in 1996 to 1,130,000 metric tons in 2009 (Ministry of Agriculture and Agro-based Industry 2010). The imports were mainly milled rice and marginally broken rice. The latter is used for production of vermicelli, kuey teow (stir-fried ricecake strips) and laksa (a spicy noodle soup). Milled rice, on the other hand, is imported for final consumption and is the central focus of the rest of this study.
Given their holistic duties to consumers, the BERNAS group of companies has developed and penetrated various supply chain levels in the domestic rice market. The majority of the imported (milled) rice is stored temporarily in warehouses and some is stockpiled. Besides serving as buffer stock, the stockpile is also cycled as trading stock for maintaining its freshness and reducing maintenance cost. Imported rice from both warehouses and stockpile centers is packed by BERNAS and non-BERNAS private mills. Some big wholesalers also own packing facilities. Rice is usually packed according to variety, broken content, country of origin and brand name. Subsequently, imported rice is distributed to stockists, retailers, and the foodservice industry. Of these supply chain levels, BERNAS possesses a significant market share at the mill and wholesale levels. Though its development at the retail level is at infant stage, the number of its retail outlets in Malaysia is expanding rapidly.
Literature review
Import demand for food can be probed using production theory or consumer theory (Armington 1969) . If a food is imported as an intermediate good that requires further processing, the production theory is chosen. If the food is imported for final consumption, the consumer theory is selected. As discussed in the previous section, imported (milled) rice is meant for direct consumption. Therefore, this section is entirely devoted to a review of theory models that are consumer based and have been used in relevant past studies.
The consumer theory approach is well described by two main econometric models, namely that of Armington (1969) and the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) model of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) . According to Winters (1984) , the AIDS model is superior to the Armington model owing to its flexibility in examining the interdependencies among imported food products by referring to expenditure elasticity and price elasticity. It is plausibly appropriate for import demand studies.
In analyzing the agricultural economics of import demand, the AIDS model is particularly appropriate. Early studies used a two-stage AIDS model (e.g. Asche et al. 1998; Chang and Hsia 2000; Seale et al. 2003; Chang and Nguyen 2002; Carew et al. 2004 ). This involves a two-stage budgeting system, which is built on the concept of a separable utility maximization function . The first stage describes import demand for a commodity group (e.g. meat) from different sources as perfect substitutes. The second stage illustrates import demand for a product within a commodity group (e.g. beef) from different sources. Despite the theoretical need to consider weak separability in the AIDS model (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980) , the first stage and the second stage are estimated separately. Subsequently, the two-stage AIDS model was criticized for creating inference problems (Edgerton et al. 1996) .
Against the two-stage AIDS model, Yang and Koo (1994) propose a single-stage AIDS model. The model is seen to be closer to reality. A company/country, which is interested in importing a food product, would only consider its perfect substitutes from different sources. It is also flexible, easy to estimate, and consistent with consumer demand theory. Hence, the single-stage AIDS model was widely used in past studies (e.g. Satyanarayana et al. 1999; Fabiosa and Ukhova 2000; Hwang 2000; Schmitz and Seale 2002; Feleke and Liu 2005; Ivanova 2005; Balagtas et al. 2006; Henneberry and Hwang 2007; Poudel and Keithly 2008; Nzaku and Houston 2009; Boonsaeng and Wohlgenant 2009 ). Among these, Hwang (2000) found that the model produced plausible estimates of demand elasticity for rice imports.
Methodology
Given the peculiar role of rice as the staple food in Malaysia, BERNAS is very unlikely to substitute rice for wheat. Instead, BERNAS is more likely to substitute rice imports from one source (e.g. Thailand) with another source (e.g. Vietnam). Hence, Deaton and Muellbauer's (1980) single-stage AIDS model is applied in this study. The model explains how a budget is proportionately allocated to import a food product from various sources (countries), on conditions of its expenditure budget, price at the source of interest, and prices of competing sources. The single-stage AIDS model can be mathematically presented as:
where s i is expenditure share of source i in total imports of the specified commodity, P j is import price from source j, x is total import expenditure on all sources in the system, and P is aggregate price index that is defined as
As the aggregate price index, P, in the AIDS model is nonlinear in the parameters, Stone's price index, P*, is commonly used in place of P in Eq. (1). This is known as Linear Approximate Almost Ideal Demand System (LA/AIDS),
where P* is expressed as
In order to be consistent with the consumer demand theory, the LA/AIDS model can be estimated with addingup, homogeneity, and Slutsky symmetry restrictions:
Homogeneity is satisfied if
When computed correctly, elasticities from the LA/AIDS model may be very similar to those of non-linear AIDS . However, Moschini (1995) and Chern et al. (2003) suggest that Tornqvist, Paasche, and Laspeyres indices in replacement of Stone's price index could produce more plausible elasticities, like those from non-linear AIDS. In a further comparison, Tey et al. (2008) found that the LA/AIDS model performed better with incorporation of Laspeyres index than Stone's index. In the context of rice import demand analysis, Hwang (2000) empirically compared the model across Tornqvist, Paasche, and Laspeyres indices. It turned out that Laspeyres index was superior to the others. Substitution of the Laspeyres price index for the Stone's price index in Eq. (3) can be written as:
where Laspeyres price index is denoted by replacing w i in Eq. (4) with a mean budget share (w i ). It can be expressed as:
However, Hwang (2000) did not validate time-series properties of his data prior to model estimations. The increasing trend of average rice import prices, which is likely to be non-stationary, might have yielded a spurious regression in his study. As such, one might obtain significant regression results from unrelated data (Hill et al. 2008) . Its associated estimates of demand elasticity might not be valid. Therefore, analysis of this study starts by identifying stationarity among individual variables in a dataset. The unit root test of Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) in level can be conducted to test the following hypothesis:
The series is non-stationary.
The series is stationary.
If the calculated Dicker-Fuller statistic is significant, H 0 is rejected. The series is stationary. If the calculated DickerFuller statistic is not significant, H 0 is not rejected. The series is non-stationary and followed by another unit root test in first-difference for the same hypothesis. If the calculated Dicker-Fuller statistic is significant, H 0 is rejected. It means that the unit root problem of a series is corrected in first-difference operator.
In addition, the LA/AIDS model is static. It might not adequately explain changes in demand for food products within a time frame (Boonsaeng and Wohlgenant 2009) . This is because changes in demand do not take place immediately in response to changes expenditure budget and/or prices of food products. Rather, they represent a reflection of gradual response to changes in these underlying factors. For capturing the dynamics, next, is to identify cointegration relationship between variables in individual regressions of Eq. (6). Johenson VAR and Engle-Granger cointegration tests are commonly in time-series studies. Of these cointegration tests, Karagiannis and Mergos (2002) If the calculated Dicker-Fuller statistic is not significant, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is not rejected. It means that the variables are not cointegrated. If the calculated Dicker-Fuller statistic is significant, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected. The variables are cointegrated in same order. The evidence of cointegration among the variables requires an error correction term to capture dynamic changes in import demand. At the same time, the evidence also rules out the possibility of obtaining spurious regression (Granger 1986) .
With incorporation of an error correction term in Eq. (6), the dynamic Error Correction Model (ECM) of the LA/ AIDS can be written as:
where Δ refers to the difference operator, s i is expenditure share of source i in total imports of rice, P j is price of rice from country j, x is total import expenditure on rice from all countries in the system, P L is Laspeyres price index, and μ it-1 is the estimated residuals from cointegration regressions. The equation can be estimated using a seemingly unrelated regression procedure, which adjusts for crossequation contemporaneous correlation (Karagiannis and Mergos 2002) .
In normal cases, estimation of the ECM-LA/AIDS model is always followed by calculations for expenditure elasticity, Marshallian (uncompensated) price elasticity and Hicksian (compensated) price elasticity of demand. In the context of this study, expenditure elasticity measures the responsiveness of demand to a change in an importer's expenditure budget; price elasticity shows how import quantity changes in response to a change in the price of a food product from the ith source. However, this study is particularly interested in obtaining expenditure elasticity and Marshallian price elasticity. Adapting United States Department of Agriculture's (2009) glossary of terms, Hicksian price elasticity is obtained by minimizing the importer's expenditures, subject to the constraint of his utility (which derives from a particular market basket) at a level whereas Marshallian price elasticity is measured by maximizing the importer's utility, subject to budget constraint and prices of other competing prices at a level. The latter principally reflects the underlying concerns of BERNAS. Expenditure elasticity and Marshallian price elasticity can be estimated using the following formulas:
Marshallian price elasticity :
where δ ij is the Knonecker delta (it is equal to one when i = j and is otherwise zero), s i is expenditure share of source i, s j is expenditure share of source j, and the others (β i and γ ij ) are parameters estimated in Eq. (8). Expenditure elasticity and own-price elasticity are expected to have positive sign and negative sign, respectively.
Data
In order to conduct the ECM-LA/AIDS, quarterly timeseries data of HS041000 of imported (milled) rice was collected from the Global Trade Atlas Navigator from 1998 to 2009. In order to understand how rice was sourced from the international market, Fig. 1 is plotted to illustrate BERNAS's import strategy before and after the Food Price Crisis. In times of crisis, we are more likely to see its performance clearly and to recognize its underlying Source:Global Trade Atlas Navigator, 2010 , 1998-2009 connection with the strategic concern of domestic food security.
Fig. 1 Sources of rice imports in Malaysia
In 1998, sources of rice imports were many and various. They were made up largely by Thailand (55%), Vietnam (25%), Pakistan (2%), and a handful of rice exporters (18%), including China, the United States, Australia and other countries. The diversified and multi-sourcing strategies were evidently successful in handling the minor Food Crisis in 1997/98.
1 As a result, the country was relatively unscathed compared to other rice importing countries in the region.
However, since the early 2000s, the experience has been more chequered. Despite frequent spikes in international rice prices (in nominal terms), BERNAS's import strategy did not respond to the structural change. Instead, it adopted a model that was opposite to the successful and proven record of diversified and multi-sourcing strategies. While Thailand remained as the most significant source of supply, the proportion from Vietnam escalated to higher levels at the expense of other countries and, since 2004, these two countries have consistently accounted for more than 90% of rice imports.
The implications of such a narrow sourcing strategy became apparent during the unfolding Food Price Crisis in 2007/08. After Vietnam halted rice exports in April 2008, other main rice exporting countries-China, India and Cambodia followed (Demeke et al. 2009 ). As a collective result, rice prices reached their peak levels and rice importing countries were invariably caught in the scramble for securing supplies from the international market. To many of these countries, domestic food security is conditioned by their being able to afford high prices and access the limited global supply. BERNAS, which is entrusted with the duty of imports, failed to deliver the expected supply. Consequently, the Malaysia government intervened and made a government-to-government trade agreement with the Thai government to secure an appropriate rice supply. Consequently, the country was saved from the impending food security crisis.
Beyond the Food Price Crisis, it was time to take corrective action and prepare for future challenges. Rice prices became lower, although still higher than they were before the crisis and the rice trade in many countries revived. However, demand patterns of rice imports within [2008] [2009] revealed that the same kind of model that had a dubious impact on domestic food security lingered on. Indeed, corrective action was not taken and the lesson of the risk in narrow sourcing strategy was not learned by BERNAS. Imports from Pakistan and other countries continued to be a fraction of total rice imports. Astonishingly, there was a sudden swap in rice imports between Vietnam and Thailand. Imports from Vietnam surged to an unprecedented level whereas those from Thailand fell to a record low.
Results
At the outset, individual variables of the time-series dataset were tested for their stationarity using the unit root test of ADF. From Appendix table 1, it can be clearly seen that there are mixed results of stationarity in level among the variables at the 5% level of significance. Further examination of the unit root test in first-difference (I(1)) showed that all calculated Dickey-Fuller statistics were significant at the 5% level. Thus, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity for individual variables was uniformly rejected. As the unit root problem of all series was corrected in the firstdifference operator, Eq. (8) can be estimated in the same form accordingly.
The Engle-Granger cointegration test was conducted for variables in individual regressions of Eq. (6). Their residual series were saved and tested with the unit root test of ADF in level. The results in Appendix table 2 show that all calculated Dickey-Fuller statistics were significant at the 5% level. The null hypothesis of non-cointegration of individual regressions was therefore rejected. The EngleGranger results suggested that all individual expenditure shares of rice imports were cointegrated with various explanatory variables in the same order. These results necessitated incorporation of an error correction term in the LA/AIDS model. Accounting for the error correction term, a dynamic ECM-LA/AIDS model as expressed in Eq. (8) was estimated via a seemingly unrelated regression procedure, with specifications for adding-up, homogeneity, and Slutsky symmetry restrictions. The estimated parameters of the dynamic ECM-LA/AIDS model are presented in Appendix table 3. They were used to estimate expenditure elasticity and Marshallian price elasticity of demand for rice imports by using the formulas of Eq. (9.1) and Eq. (9.2), respectively. These estimates are the central interest of this study and are summarized in Table 1 .
In this study, expenditure elasticity estimates indicated how import demand (quantity) changes in response to a change in BERNAS's expenditure budget for rice imports were, when other things remained constant. The estimates of expenditure elasticity varied from 0.6415 to 1.2015 and were positive as expected. The positive signs suggest that BERNAS is expected to continue importing rice from various sources. Among these estimates, a 10% change in the expenditure budget is likely to get about 12% adjustment in the quantity demanded for Vietnamese rice, ceteris paribus. Such demand for Vietnamese rice (1.2015) is said to be expenditure elastic. In contrast, the demand for rice from Thailand (0.9797), Pakistan (0.6415), and other countries (0.6511) is inelastic to changes in the expenditure budget. If there is an increase in BERNAS's expenditure budget, rice imports from Vietnam and Thailand are postulated to grow at a faster pace than Pakistan and other countries, when other things remain unchanged. The demand patterns suggest that BERNAS is likely to continue sourcing rice largely from Vietnam and Thailand.
Given that rice prices are volatile, special attention was devoted to their own-price effects. Estimates of Marshallian own-price elasticity explain the adjustment degree in import demand (quantity) in relation to a change in rice price of an interested source, when other things remain constant. The estimates of own-price elasticity ranged from −0.3930 to −2.2477 and have the expected negative signs. Their negative signs are consistent with priori expectations and indicate that there is an inverse relationship between ownprice and import demand. The demand for rice from other countries (−2.2477), Vietnam (−1.8889), and Thailand (−1.5467) is price elastic. A 10% change in their individual own-prices is expected to have more than 10% adjustment in quantity demanded from these sources, ceteris paribus. Among these, import demand is more sensitive to price change in Vietnamese rice than Thai rice. As Vietnam always adjusts its rice prices according to changes in the price of Thai rice, a 10% price cut in the latter is expected to see a similar price adjustment in Vietnamese rice. As a response to this, BERNAS is more likely to import more rice from Vietnam than Thailand. These findings probably explain the earlier observation of the sudden swap between Thai rice and Vietnamese rice in the Malaysian import basket in tandem with depreciation in their post-crisis prices.
Policy implications
Though rice imports are not addressed in the current food security framework and various agricultural policies, selfsufficiency levels that are targeted in the National Food Security and the latest Tenth Malaysian Plan have asserted that Malaysia will continue to be a net importer of rice. The country still requires rice imports for fulfilling more than a quarter of its annual rice requirement. Therefore, it is vital to recognize that domestic food security is formed by domestic rice and imported rice. BERNAS's import strategy has serious implication for national food security.
The estimates of expenditure elasticity suggest that Malaysia is going to import rice largely from Thailand and Vietnam. Such a narrow sourcing strategy is the same as the pre-crisis 'business-as-usual' model. Recalling the devastating experience during the Food Price Crisis, the sourcing strategy was poor in alleviating supply disruption in the international rice market. Hence, the current state of narrow sourcing strategy must be reviewed. More critically, the expenditure elasticity estimates also suggest a tendency favoring Vietnamese rice over Thai rice. When imported rice was crucially needed, Thailand was the only available party who rendered the supply. It is not too difficult to recognize that Thailand is a more promising source of rice imports. From another important perspective, the estimates of own-price elasticity show that BERNAS is more responsive to changes in prices of Vietnamese rice than Thai rice, Pakistani rice, and other rice. As Vietnamese rice prices are speculated to remain lower than Thai rice (Thuong 2010) , more rice is to be imported from Vietnam. While such demand patterns of rice imports are puzzling, it could be related to prioritization of short-term profit over domestic food security. Policymakers and BERNAS must start to ponder how to balance the public-listed company's interest and the national food security.
The discussion above has underscored a need for an effective multi-sourcing strategy, which can possibly mitigate the negative impact of supply disruptions. For this purpose, Fig. 2 illustrates how rice can be multisourced from various rice exporting countries. Indeed, rice harvesting periods are varied across these countries. In return, they offer month-to-month availability. Rice 
Conclusion
Malaysia is and will be a net rice importer for many years to come. Rice is imported to fulfill more than a quarter of its annual rice demand. Domestic food security, hence, is a function of both domestic production and imports. However, the latter is neither included in the current food security framework and agricultural policies nor addressed in past studies. The import strategy of BERNAS plays a crucial role in determining the country's food security. This study provides some meaningful insights as to how its import strategy is being carried out by understanding demand patterns of rice imports in Malaysia. Estimates of expenditure elasticity and own-price elasticity consistently suggest that more rice will be narrowly sourced, largely from Vietnam, follow by Thailand. Such a narrow sourcing strategy, which is similar to its pre-crisis model, must be reviewed. An effective multi-sourcing strategy for rice is needed to avoid a crisis in securing supply from the international market. Such a strategy might also apply to paddy imports for supporting domestic downstream value-adding activities. In addition, there is a tendency to favor Vietnamese rice over Thai rice. However, the experience in the Food Price Crisis argues that Thailand is a more promising source. The preference of Vietnamese rice over Thai rice could be due to its profit orientation but a balance point should be made to safeguard the national food security. From these different points of view, various weaknesses of current import strategy should be recognized as a single subject, calling for a bold food security framework. 
